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The Long and the Short of It: The Influence of 
Briefs on Outcomes in the Roberts Court 
 
Morgan L. W. Hazelton* 
 
Rachael K. Hinkle** 
 
James F. Spriggs II*** 
 
This Article considers the role of information, 
affected groups, and persuasion in the connection 
between justice votes and the content of briefs in the 
Roberts Court.  Our results shed new light on the 
previously observed finding that the side with the 
most briefs is more likely to win.  We find that the 
true advantage lies in providing the Court with a 
greater amount of information overall, and that 
holding total information constant, a greater number 
of briefs is, surprisingly, a disadvantage. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
On April 27, 2016, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments 
in McDonnell v. United States, a corruption case concerning the 
appropriate standard for prosecutions.1  Immediately after a deputy 
 
* Assistant Professor, Saint Louis University Department of Political and 
School of Law (by courtesy). 
** Assistant Professor, University at Buffalo, SUNY. 
*** Sidney W. Souers Professor of Government and Chair of the 
Department of Political Science, Washington University in St. Louis. 
1 Tony Mauro & Marcia Coyle, A Potential Gift to Politicians, from 
the Justices: In Case Against Bob McDonnell, Justices Troubled by 
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solicitor general began to lay out the government’s defense, Chief 
Justice Roberts raised questions about an “extraordinary 
document”—an amicus curiae brief by former government attorneys 
filed in opposition to the government’s position.2  As some 
commentators predicted,3 Justice Roberts’s questions, in combination 
with inquiries from other Justices at oral argument, portended doom 
for the government’s argument.4 This case is just one of many 
examples in which information found in briefs appears to have been 
important to Justices.5 
 
As amicus participation at the Supreme Court has grown over 
the years, so has the interest in such filings.6 Both have continued to 
grow during the Roberts Court, with commentators and scholars 
considering the role of amicus briefs in the decisions the Justices 
make.7  Scholars theorize that briefs influence the Justices by 
 
Prosecutors’ Broad Interpretation of “Official Act,” NAT’L L. J. ( May 2, 
2016), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202756391208/A-Potential-
Gift-to-Politicians-from-the-Justices?slreturn=20161030181747; see also 
Greg Stohr, Supreme Court May Raise Bar for Corruption, BLOOMBERG 
POL. (Apr. 27, 2016, 10:17 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2016-04-27/u-s-high-court-may-
raise-bar-for-corruption-prosecutions.  
2. Mauro & Coyle, supra note 1; Stohr, supra note 1. 
3.  Mauro & Coyle, supra note 1; Stohr, supra note 1. 
4.  Mauro & Coyle, supra note 1; McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. 
Ct. 2355 (2016). 
5.  Adam Feldman, Amicus Briefs and Oral Arguments in the Roberts 
Court, EMPIRICAL SCOTUS BLOG, (Mar. 7, 2016), 
https://empiricalscotus.com/2016/03/07/amicus-briefs-and-oral-arguments-
in-the-roberts-court/. 
6. See, e.g., PAUL M. COLLINS, JR., FRIENDS OF THE SUPREME COURT: 
INTEREST GROUPS AND JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING (2008); Joseph D. 
Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on 
the Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 743 (2000); James F. Spriggs, II & 
Paul Wahlbeck, Amicus Curiae and the Role of Information at the Supreme 
Court, 50 POL. RES. Q. 365 (1997). 
7.  Richard Pacelle, Jr. et al., Assessing the Influence of Amicus Curiae 
Briefs on the Roberts Court (Annual Meeting of the Southern Political 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol54/iss1/14
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conveying information relevant for deciding cases.8  This information 
can help Justices discern the range of alternatives available in a case, 
how such options map onto their preferences, and the practical 
consequences of different legal rulings.9   
 
Science Association, Working Paper, 2016) (on file with authors). There is 
now a forthcoming version of the paper that is cited as follows: Richard L. 
Pacelle, Jr., John M. Scheb II, Hemant K. Sharma & David H. Scott, 
Assessing the Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on the Roberts Court 
(forthcoming in SOC. SCI. Q.); David H. Scott, Friendly Fire: Amicus Curiae 
Participation and Impact at the Roberts Court (Dec. 2013) (unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Tennessee – Knoxville), 
http://trace.tennessee.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3448&context=utk_gr
addiss; R. Reeves Anderson & Anthony J. Franze, Commentary: The 
Court’s Increasing Reliance on Amicus Curiae in the Past Term, NAT’L L. J. 
(Aug. 24, 2011), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202512150444 
/Commentary-The-Courts-increasing-reliance-on-amicus-curiae-in-the-past-
term. 
8,  See LEE EPSTEIN & JOSEPH F. KOBYLKA, THE SUPREME COURT AND 
LEGAL CHANGE: ABORTION AND THE DEATH PENALTY 309–10 (1992); Paul 
M. Collins, Jr., Friends of the Court: Examining the Influence of Amicus 
Curiae Participation in U.S. Supreme Court Litigation, 38 L. & SOC. REV. 
807 (2004) [hereinafter Friends]; Paul M. Collins, Lobbyists Before the U.S. 
Supreme Court: Investigating the Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs, 60 
POL. RES. Q. 55 (2007) [hereinafter Lobbyists]; Collins et al., Me Too? An 
Investigation of Repetition in U.S. Supreme Court Amicus Curiae Briefs, 97 
JUDICATURE 228 (2014); Pamela C. Corley, The Supreme Court and 
Opinion Content: The Influence of Parties’ Briefs, 61 POL. RES. Q. 468 
(2008); Thomas G. Hansford, Information Provision, Organizational 
Constraints, and the Decision to Submit an Amicus Curiae Brief in a U.S. 
Supreme Court Case, 57 POL. RES. Q. 219 (2004); Thomas G. Hansford & 
Kristen Johnson, The Supply of Amicus Curiae Briefs in the Market for 
Information at the U.S. Supreme Court, 35 JUST. SYS. J. 362 (2014); Kearny 
& Merrill, supra note 6; Spriggs & Wahlbeck supra note 6. 
9.  See Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, Mapping Out the Strategic Terrain: 
The Information Role of Amici Curiae, in SUPREME COURT DECISION 
MAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONAL APPROACHES (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard 
Gillman eds., 1999); John Szmer & Martha Humphries Ginn, Examining the 
Effects of Information, Attorney Capability, and Amicus Participation on US 
Supreme Court Decision Making 42 AM. POL. RES. 441 (2013); see also 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Although the conceptual focus of much of the literature is on 
the information provided by briefs, empirical analyses do not 
typically examine the informational content of briefs.10  Rather, many 
previous studies focus on the relationship between the number of 
briefs on a side and the likelihood of that side winning a case.11 These 
studies generally find a modest relationship between the likelihood of 
winning and the side with the most briefs. Without suggesting that 
the volume of briefs is irrelevant, we argue research needs to consider 
the informational content of briefs directly. In this Article, rather than 
simply analyzing the raw number of briefs submitted, we consider the 
influence of the relative amount and breadth of information contained 
in the party and amici briefs for each side of a case on the Justices’ 
votes.  This pooled approach to exploring the role of all briefs is ideal 
based on evidence of sophisticated coordination among parties and 
amici.12   
 
We first discuss the prevailing theoretical approaches to 
understanding the influence of briefs. This discussion leads to a series 
of hypotheses about the role of information in influencing the 
Justices’ votes on the merits.   
 
We then describe our dataset, which consists of 9,912 litigant 
and amici briefs filed in all orally argued cases decided by the Court 
between the 2005 to 2015 terms.  From these briefs, we create several 
 
Timothy R. Johnson, Information, Oral Arguments, and Supreme Court 
Decision Making, 29 AM. POL. RES. 331, 333 (2001) (discussing the role of 
litigant and amicus briefs in informing the justices as part of a larger article 
focused on the role of oral arguments). 
10.  Spriggs & Wahlbeck, supra note 6. 
11. See, e.g., Friends, supra note 11; Lobbyists, supra note 11 (finding 
that the difference in the number of briefs on both sides is significant). 
12. Allison Orr Larsen & Neal Devins, The Amicus Machine, VA. L. 
REV. (forthcoming); see also Adam Liptak, Study Shows How Much Work It 
Takes to Be Supreme Court’s Friend, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 7, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/08/us/politics/study-shows-how-much-
work-it-takes-to-be-supreme-courts-friend.html?_r=0. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol54/iss1/14
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measures of the amount and breadth of information provided for each 
side.  Our empirical tests determine to what degree the Justices’ votes 
depend on the relative amount and breadth of information provided 
by each side, as well as the difference in the number of briefs filed 
for each side, while controlling for other relevant variables.   
 
Our results indicate the Justices are more likely to vote for 
the litigant whose supporting briefs provide a greater amount of 
information to the Court.  Importantly, after including variables for 
the content of the information in briefs, there is no evidence the 
Justices are more likely to vote for the side with more briefs.  This 
result suggests the mechanism underlying the influence of briefs is 
informational content rather than merely the raw number of 
supporting briefs.   
 
I. THEORIES REGARDING THE INFLUENCE OF BRIEFS 
 
There are multiple theories regarding the importance of briefs 
on the decisions of the Court. First, according to accounts that focus 
on the role of information in briefs, briefs are valuable because they 
contain facts and arguments that help the Justices map preferences 
onto policies13 or discover “legally relevant information.”14 Under 
such theories, additional information in favor of a side is likely to 
increase support for that side, as it reduces uncertainty and helps the 
Justices craft their decisions.15 One can consider the amount of 
information presented in terms of, first, the total amount of 
information presented, where the side with the greater amount of 
information should be advantaged. In addition to the relative volume 
of information across the two sides of a case, they can differ in terms 
of the breadth of the information they provide. Some briefs might 
 
13. See Epstein & Knight, supra note 9; Friends, supra note 8; Johnson, 
supra note 9 at 333; Johnson et al., supra note 9; Szmer & Ginn, supra note 
9. 
14. Kearney & Merrill, supra note 6, at 830. 
15. See supra note 9; Friends, supra note 8; Lobbyists, supra note 8; but 
see Collins, supra note 6, at 120 (arguing that amicus briefs increase 
ambiguity and result in increased variability in decision-making). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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discuss a wider array of issues and ideas, and the side with a wider 
array of legal theories and approaches may be more likely to win. 
Studies of the role of both ideology and cognitive processes indicate, 
however, that the influence of information may be filtered through 
the preferences of the Justices.16   
Second, affected groups or interest group theory indicates the 
number of groups filing briefs on a side may be important, regardless 
of amount of overall information provided, because it indicates 
general support for the position17 or specific support from powerful 
groups.18  Finally, some scholars theorize briefs are more persuasive 
when they contain repetitive information.19 Specifically, persuasion 
 
16. EILEEN BRAMAN, LAW, POLITICS, & PERCEPTION: HOW POLICY 
PREFERENCES INFLUENCE LEGAL REASONING (2009); JEFFREY A. SEGAL & 
HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL 
REVISITED (1993); Eileen Braman & Thomas E. Nelson, Mechanism of 
Motivated Reasoning? Analogical Perception in Discrimination Disputes, 
51 AM. J. OF POL. SCI. 940 (2007); Avani Mehta Sood, Motivated Cognition 
in Legal Judgments—An Analytic Review, 9 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 307 
(2013); but see Collins, supra note 6 (finding that for 95% of observation 
Justice ideology does not appear to mediate how information is processed); 
Barbara A. Spellman, Judges, Expertise, and Analogy, in THE PSYCHOLOGY 
OF JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING (David Klein & George Mitchell eds., 2010) 
(arguing that bias in processing information may be a function of 
experience); Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. 
REV. 777 (2000) (asserting that variation may be the result of systematic 
errors inherent to cognition). 
17. Friends, supra note 8; Scott, supra note 7; Linda S. Simard, 
Empirical Study of Amici Curiae in Federal Court: A Fine Balance of 
Access, Efficiency, and Adversarialism, 27 REV. LIT. 669 (2007). 
18. Kearney & Merrill, supra note 6. 
19. See Friends, supra note 8; Collins et al., supra note 8; Kearney & 
Merrill, supra note 6; Claire B. Wofford, Assessing the Anecdotes: Amicus 
Curiae, Legal Rules, and the U.S. Supreme Court, 36 JUST. SYS. J. 274, 279 
(2015) (discussing repetition of a specific legal rule); see also Spriggs & 
Wahlbeck, supra note 6 (discussing their finding that “the Court less 
frequently utilizes amicus briefs' arguments when they exclusively add 
information not contained in the party's brief”). This theory and 
corresponding empirical results are particularly interesting in light of the 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol54/iss1/14
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theory indicates the number of voices repeating an argument is more 
important than the total amount of information presented by a side.     
 
From these various accounts of the influence of briefs on 
Supreme Court Justices, we propose three hypotheses regarding the 
role of amicus briefs on the Roberts Court: 
 
Number of Briefs Hypothesis: An increase in the 
relative number of briefs filed arguing for reversal, 
over those arguing for affirmance, will increase the 
probability a Justice votes for the petitioner. 
 
Total Information Hypothesis: An increase in the 
total amount of information in briefs filed arguing 
for reversal, over those arguing for affirmance, will 
increase the probability a Justice votes for the 
petitioner. 
 
Breadth of Information Hypothesis: An increase 
in the range of different information in briefs filed 
arguing for reversal, over those arguing for 
affirmance, will increase the probability a Justice 
votes for the petitioner. 
 
II. DATA, MEASURES, AND METHODS 
 
 To evaluate the effects of information provided to the 
Roberts Court, we have amassed all briefs available from Westlaw 
for orally argued cases from 2005 to 2015.  Because our focus is on 
the merits stage, we exclude all briefs regarding whether a petition 
 
stress placed on the importance of new information in amicus briefs found in 
both the Supreme Court’s rules (Rule 37) and guides for writing effective 
amicus briefs. See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, MAKING YOUR 
CASE: THE ART OF PERSUADING JUDGES (2008); Kelly J. Lynch, Best 
Friends?: Supreme Court Law Clerks on Effective Amicus Curiae Briefs, 20 
J.L. & POL. 33 (2004).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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for certiorari should be granted as well as any briefs regarding non-
dispositive matters. We have also excluded the small number of 
supplemental briefs filed by the parties. The end result is a dataset 
composed of 9,912 briefs.20  
 
We explore the cumulative effect of all the briefs filed by 
both litigants and amici on each side of a case.  The unit of analysis is 
the case-vote; and the outcome variable equals one if a Justice voted 
in favor of the petitioner (and zero otherwise).  Information on 
whether each Justice voted in favor of the petitioner was obtained 
from the Supreme Court Database.21  In order to contrast our findings 
with those from the literature we estimate two models.  The first 
model includes all of our relative informational variables in order to 
test the three hypotheses.  For comparison, we estimate a second 
model that excludes all relative information variables except for the 
difference in the number of briefs on each side.  Since the outcome 
variable can only take on two possible values (zero or one), we utilize 
probit modes which are a type of statistical model that is specifically 
designed to model such binary outcomes.  Both models also include 
fixed effects for term and Justice (although they are not shown).  
 
Our primary explanatory variables are a series of measures of 
the relative content presented to the Court.  For each of these 
measures, the difference is calculated by subtracting the relevant 
quantity for briefs filed on the respondent’s side from the relevant 
quantity for the briefs filed on the petitioner’s side.  For example, the 
variable Difference in Number of Briefs is the number of briefs filed 
urging reversal minus the number of briefs filed urging affirmance.  
Each side includes all relevant briefs filed by both parties and amici.  
Since the outcome variable is whether a Justice voted for the 
petitioner, positive coefficients on our difference measures indicate 
 
20. Based on work we have done assessing the completeness of the 
Westlaw database in years immediately preceding the Roberts Court, we 
estimate that this database is 95% complete. 
21. Harold J. Spaeth et al., SUPREME COURT DATABASE (2016), 
http://supremecourtdatabase.org. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol54/iss1/14
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that more briefs is better, the pattern anticipated by all of our 
hypotheses. 
 
We go beyond simply counting the number of briefs on each 
side to measure both relative aggregate information and the relative 
breadth of the information presented on each side.  For our first 
measure of total information we begin with the standard approach of 
using a simple word count as a rough approximation of the 
information in a document.22  However, the impact of additional 
information will tend to decrease as the total word count grows.  The 
difference between 2,000 and 1,000 words should be much more 
substantial than the difference between 12,000 words and 11,000 
words.  Consequently, we take the standard precaution of using the 
natural log of the word count of the briefs on each side before 
calculating the difference.    
 
Our second measure of the total amount of information on 
each side is the total number of citations (in hundreds) to Supreme 
Court precedent.  Legal citations are an important source of a 
particular type of information.23 Attorneys naturally incorporate 
reference to case law in their legal arguments to the Supreme Court. 
Citations to precedent from the Supreme Court are the most 
theoretically relevant sources because they are most likely to 
influence the Court. References to such cases take on a finite number 
of forms and, therefore, can be reliably extracted from text.24 
 
22. JOHN D. HUBER & CHARLES R. SHIPAN, DELIBERATE DISCRETION: 
THE INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY (2002); 
John D. Huber, Charles R. Shipan & Madelaine Pfahler, Legislatures and 
Statutory Control of Bureaucracy, 45 AM. J. OF POL. SCI. 330 (2001) (using 
word counts to measure the amount of information in statutes).  
23. See, e.g., Collins, supra note 6; THOMAS G. HANSFORD & JAMES F. 
SPRIGGS, THE POLITICS OF PRECEDENT ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 
(2008).  
24. A python script was used to extract all text strings matching the 
format of a citation to a U.S. Supreme Court case. Extracted cites were 
compared against a list of valid citations to Supreme Court cases decided on 
the merits, and only validated citations were used. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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We also use words and citations to calculate the relative 
breadth of information presented by briefs. To do so, we count the 
number of different individual words and cases cited in the set of 
briefs on each side. 25 Each new legal issue that is raised will bring 
additional words and precedents into the discussion. Consequently, 
holding the aggregate amount of information constant, briefs that 
incorporate a wider vocabulary or discuss more precedents are likely 
to be addressing a broader set of issues. Conversely, a decrease in 
these measures indicates a higher degree of repetition. 
 
Finally, we incorporate other variables that may affect the 
Justices’ votes.  Because many commentators have noticed the 
success of the Office of the Solicitor General in Supreme Court 
litigation, we control for whether the Solicitor General filed a brief on 
behalf of the petitioner or respondent.  Next, we account for the 
ideology of the Supreme Court Justices.  In order to quantify the 
ideological alignment between a Justice and the petitioner we use a 
standard measure of Supreme Court ideology, Martin-Quinn scores.26  
When the petitioner is seeking a conservative outcome, the variable 
Ideological Alignment is the Martin-Quinn score of the Justice, 
because higher Martin-Quinn scores denote greater conservatism. 
When the petitioner is advocating a liberal outcome, Ideological 
Alignment is the Martin-Quinn score of the Justice multiplied by -1. 
Finally, we control for whether there was unanimity in the lower 
court proceedings. The lack of a dissenting opinion below may 
indicate somewhat greater legal certainty in the case, which would 
potentially make it more difficult for petitioners to obtain votes in 
their favor. We measure this variable as one if there was no dissent 
below and zero otherwise.  
 
 
25. For convenience, the number of unique words on each side is 
normalized by one thousand, and the number of unique cases cited on each 
side is normalized by one hundred. 
26. Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point 
Estimation via Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 
1953-1999, 10 POL. ANALYSIS 134 (2002). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol54/iss1/14
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Summary statistics for all of our explanatory variables are 
available in Table 1: 
Percentile27 25th % 50th % 75th % 
Difference in # of Briefs -1 1 3 
Difference in ln (Word Count) -0.23 0.19 0.60 
Difference in Total S.Ct. Cites -29 27 94 
Difference in # of Unique Words -735 309 1,153 
Difference in S.Ct. Cases Cited -16 5 25 
Ideological Alignment w/Pet. -1.61 0.04 1.62 
Percentages No Yes  
Solicitor General: Petitioner 95.7% 4.3%  
Solicitor General: Respondent 95.8% 4.2%  
Unanimous Below 57.2% 42.8%  
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 
 
III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
 Table 2 presents the results of both models. The petitioner’s 
advantage in terms of the number of briefs is statistically significant 
in both models, but the sign changes direction. Model 2, which 
excludes measures of the relative content of the briefing on each side, 
estimates that having a greater number of briefs has a positive impact 
on the probability of obtaining votes. However, this well-known 
finding flips sign when we account for the contents of the briefs. 
While our measures of the breadth of information in the briefing are 
not statistically significant, a relative advantage in total aggregate 
information measured in terms of both words and cites is 
significantly associated with a higher probability of getting a 
Justice’s vote. Moreover, the size of both of these hypothesized 
effects is large. Increasing the petitioner’s advantage from its 25% 
 
27. The numbers for percentiles of the distribution indicate the values for 
each variable when the observations are ordered from lowest to highest.  
Specifically, the values at the bottom quarter (25%), median (50%), and top 
quarter (75%) are provided. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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value in the data to its 75% value results in the predicted probability 
of a favorable vote increasing by a somewhat modest 0.03 for total 
citations, but the increase is a more substantial 0.10 for word count.  
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Probit model results with fixed effects for term and 
Justice (not shown).  * indicates a p-value < .05. 
 
Our findings do not necessarily turn the conventional wisdom 
on its head; they simply offer more nuanced insight into why a greater 
number of briefs appears to translate into greater success. The side 
 Model 1  Model 2 
 Coef. (S.E.
) 
 Coef. (S.E.
) 
Difference in # of Briefs -
0.015* 
(0.00
8) 
  
0.020* 
(0.00
3) 
Difference in ln(Word Count)  
0.361* 
(0.06
6) 
   
Diff. in Total S.Ct. Cites/100  
0.078* 
(0.02
4) 
   
Diff. in Unique Words/1000 -
0.036 
(0.04
0) 
   
Diff. in S.Ct. Cases Cited/100 -
0.020 
(0.08
9) 
   
Solicitor General: Petitioner  
0.027 
(0.08
6) 
  
0.079 
(0.08
4) 
Solicitor General: Respondent -
0.427* 
(0.08
9) 
 -
0.473* 
(0.08
7) 
Ideological Alignment w/Pet.  
0.172* 
(0.00
9) 
  
0.169* 
(0.00
9) 
Unanimous Below -
0.233* 
(0.03
5) 
 -
0.219* 
(0.03
4) 
Intercept  
0.258* 
(0.09
1) 
  
0.273* 
(0.09
0) 
N 6,025  6,025 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol54/iss1/14
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with more briefs is often presenting more information to the Court. 
However, the advantage is evidently driven by the overall quantity of 
information rather than the raw number of briefs presented. In fact, in 
a case where the two sides submit briefing of the same length and 
with the same number of citations, the side that manages to do so in 
fewer briefs has the advantage. Figure 1 provides an illustration of 
how the number of briefs and total information work together: it 
shows the predicted probability of a vote for the petitioner over the 
range of possible values for the petitioner’s numerical advantage (or 
lack thereof) in terms of both the number of briefs and total citations 
in turn while holding the other variable at its minimum, median, and 
maximum. For example, when a petitioner has the maximum 
advantage in terms of total citations to Supreme Court precedent, the 
predicted probability of securing a vote is quite high no matter where 
the differential in the number of briefs lies. 
 
Diff. in # of Briefs
Pr
ed
. P
ro
b.
−55 −35 −15 0 15 30
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
Diff. in Total # of Cites
Pr
ed
. P
ro
b.
−1200 −600 0 450 900
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1
 
 
Figure 1: Predicted probabilities of a vote for the petitioner across 
the range of Difference in # of Briefs (left panel) and Difference in 
Total S. Ct. Citations (right panel) when holding the other at its 
minimum (dashed line), median (solid line), and maximum value 
(dotted line) in turn. All remaining variables are held at their median.  
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The remaining variables perform largely as expected, and 
they have quite similar effects across the two models. The presence 
of the Solicitor General arguing on behalf of the petitioner does not 
have a statistically significant effect, while the Solicitor General 
arguing on behalf of the respondent does result in the expected 
significant reduction in the probability a Justice votes for the 
petitioner. Unsurprisingly, Justices who are more closely aligned with 
the petitioner ideologically are more likely to vote for the petitioner. 
Finally, the petitioner faces more difficulty in obtaining votes at the 
Supreme Court level when all judges who heard the case in the lower 
courts unanimously ruled against the petitioner. 
 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The literature examining the relationship between briefs and the 
Justices’ votes argues that briefs matter because they provide 
information the Justices find useful when deciding cases.  The 
empirical evidence to date demonstrates a modest relationship 
between the number of briefs supporting a litigant and the probability 
that the litigant prevails on the merits.  Missing, though, were 
analyses that probe directly the effectiveness of the actual 
information contained in the briefs, rather than their mere presence.   
 
We tried to fill this gap. Our results show that the more 
information presented in the briefs—both in terms of words and 
citations—the more likely a Justice is to vote for that side of the case.  
This result, importantly, withstands the presence of numerous 
controls, including a variable for the number of briefs supporting 
each side. As a result, we conclude the underlying mechanism 
connecting briefs and the Justices’ votes is the information contained 
in the briefs rather than the mere presence of the briefs.  This is an 
important result, as it is the first time a study demonstrates a direct 
connection between the actual content of briefs and the Justices’ 
votes on the merits.      
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